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Risk attitudes play a critical role in determining the demand for insurance as well
as the demand for risky assets and the equilibrium returns on these assets. Despite
the importance of risk preferences, we still have very little idea about the answer
to empirical issues like the average risk aversion of individuals, the determinants
of risk atttitudes and the heterogeneity among individuals. The empirical findings
depend to a large extent on the particular methods used to investigate these issues.
Friend and Blume (1975) obtain indirect evidence about the degree of risk aversion
from individual asset holdings. They estimate the coefGcient of relative risk aversion
(RRA) at roughly between 2 and 3. Other indirect evidence is provided by the equity
premium puzzle. The observed spread between average stock returns and the risk free
interest rate can only be consistent with an expected-utility maximising framework
if we assume extreme degrees of risk aversion, usually around 20.r Campbell (1996)
shows that the puzzle is compounded if one includes human capital in measured
wealth and if one allows for mean reversion in the asset returns.
Direct evidence on the degree of risk aversion is obtained by Gertner (1993) from
data on the television game show "Card Sharks". Although somewhat higher, his
risk-aversion estimates are compatable to Friend and Blume's (1975) estimates. In
another natural experiment, based on the television game show "Jeopardy", Metrick
(1995) concludes that players display near risk neutrality. Finally, in an experiment in
which Chinese students are presented with basic lotteries, Kachelmeier and Shehata
(1992) find large differences between how much individuals aze willing to pay for a
lottery and for how much they are willing to sell the same lottery. This suggests that
revealed risk preferences depend on the way problems are framed.
In this paper we use data from the television game show LINGO to measure risk
attitudes. LINGO is a game show on Dutch television which is played by couples
(usually frieQds, family or colleagues) over a maximum number of five rounds. Each
round involves solving a word puzzle. At the start of each round, the couple decides
whether to stop, or to continue and try to solve the word puzzle. If they stop they
take home what they have won so far, while if they continue either their wins double
or they lose everything and the game is over. In the latter case they can come back
~ Mehra and Prescott (1985) contains the original statement of the equity premium puzzle.
Kocherlakota (1996) and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) provide an oveniew of the literature.
The latter also summarise the empirical tesults for the United States.
1in next day's show, with a maximum of three appearances.
For several reasons L[tvGO can be seen as a natural experiment for measuring risk
attitudes. First, the decisions that a couple has to take are extremely simple, because
LINGO is a non-strategic game which effectively reduces to a sequence of elementary
lotteries in which the probability of winning declines over the rounds. Second, the
decisions involve serious amounts of money for most players. On average, a couple
takes home over 5,000 Dutch guilders (1 Dutch guilder (j) is approximately á0.6).
Finally, the game has been played so often that any learning effects can be reasonably
assumed away. All this contributes to the validity of the assumption that players make
decisions that reveal their true risk preferences.
We estimate constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) utility specifications for the players. In both cases we find robust
evidence of substantial risk averaion. As a specíal case of CRRA utility, we follow
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) by estimating the power utility function which as-
sumes that individuals' utility is defined in terms of gains (and losses) rather than
final wealth. Our estimateof the CRRA coefficient squares rather well with what they
find. However, in contrast to what power utility predicts for these simple lotteries,
we find that the stake plays a very important role in the decisions of the players. In
particular, as the stake increases the willingness to continue decreases, ceteris paribus.
This effect can be captured in the case of CRRA utility by assuming that gains are
measured relative to some reference wealth level (usually initial wealth), or by es-
timating a CARA utility specification, which has the advantage that decisions are
independent of initial wealth.
Because individuals' wealth levels are unobservable, the CRRA specification con-
tains both the coefficient of relative risk aversion (RRA) as well as the reference wealth
level as parameters. It is hardly possible to identify these two parameters separately.
Therefore, we estimate the RRA coefficient while conditioning on different values of
reference wealth. The estimate of the ecefficient increases in reference wealth. This is
reminiscent of Campbell's (1996) finding that the RRA coefficient needed to explain
the equity premium puzzle becomes even higher if one also allows for human capital
as part of an individual's wealth. For our data, if we set wealth at f50,000, we ob-
tain an estimate of the RRA coefficient of approximately 6.5, which is well above the
classical risk aversion estimates of Friend and Blume (1975), but below Campbell's
(1996) estimates of the degree of risk aversion.
2The number of studies that use an experiment with high monetary stakes and so
many observations to obtain direct estimates of risk aversion is very small. Closest in
spirit to our paper is the work by Gertner (1993). Qualitatively speaking, we confirm
most of his findings using an independent (and larger) data set of a game which is
even much simpler. However, we also extend his work in a number of ways. First, we
take explicit account of the effect of the option to take decisions in future rounds on
the optimal decision in the current round. Second, we compare the predictive power
of decision models based on expected utility maximisation with decision models based
on "rules of thumb" (i.e., simple rules linking decisions to directly observable statistics
from the game). Despite the functional restrictions imposed by the expected utility
model, we find that its performance in predicting decisions is comparable to that for
rules of thumb.
A third extension is that we also estimate the expected utility models with sub-
jective probabilities rather than the "truen probabilities. The subjective probabilities
are the implicit decision weights that players use in calculating their odds. It turns
out that players tend to overestimate their winning chances substantially. To never-
theless explain that players do indeed sometimes stop, the estimated degree of risk
aversion increases further. The subjective survival probability is increasing in the
true survival probability, although at a rate which is much less than proportional.
Although some people might question the appropriateness of estimating the degree
of risk aversion while allowing for biases in the assessment of survival probabilities,
we believe that these are two distinct issues.2 Given the assessment of their odds,
however wrong they may be, individuals take decisions according to their personal
risk attitudes, which is what we try to quantify. In the context of the present game,
mistakes in the assessment of the survival chances may arise for various reasons. The
most likely is that players systematically overestimate their ability to solve the word
puzzles in LINGO. Indeed, there is a substantial amount of evidence that individuals
tend to be overconfident when taking decisions under uncertainty.3 A second possible
explanation is that players possess bounded rationality as far as complex computa-
Z It is sometimes argued that transíormations of probabilities should be considered as an integral
part of an individual's risk attitudes (see Wakker, 1994).
3 Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Arrow (1982) provide overviews of common biases in peo-
ple's aasessments of orobabilities. Camerer (1987) explores such biases in the context of an experi-
mental mazket. Gneezy (1997) presents evidence on the failure of individuals to adjust the perceived
probability distribution of final outcomes when a game or lottery is played repeatedly.
3tions of their odds are concerned.4 However, it is hard to see how this could lead
to a systematic bias in the perceived odds. It would only add some randomness to
the perceived probabilities. We will account for this effect in the empirical model.
These explanations can be perfectly consistent with psychological models of decision
making under uncertainty. In fact, replacing probabilities with decision weights is
one of the key elements of prospect theory (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 1932,
and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
We emphasise that the substantial degree of risk aversion we find is likely to be
only a lower bound on the true degree of risk aversion. There are three reasons for
this conjecture. First, people who participate in LINGO probably like these types of
games. If anything, this should induce them to continue playing longer than they
otherwise would. Secondly, there may be a camera bias which also induces them to
continue longer than they otherwise would prefer to. In other words, playing the
game and being on television might be part of peoples' utility. These effects are
partly captured by estimates we obtain for the option value of coming back the next
day in the case of first and second finals. This option captures both the expected
monetary gains when coming back, but also the utility of playing the game, or of
being on television once more. To take care of these potential biases we also estimate
the model exclusively on third finals. A third reason why the estimated degree of risk
aversion may be lower than it actually is, is the "gambling with the house money~
effect (see Thaler and Johnson, 1990): players have not yet got accustomed to the
money they have won so far and are, therefore, more willing to bet their stakes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the game,
while Section 3 describes the data and provides summary statistics. In Section 4
we estimate decision models based on rules of thumb. Indeed, directly observable
statistics go quite a long way explaining observed decisions. Section 5 provides the
theory for the estimation of the expected utility maximisation models. In particular,
we show that due to the particular structure of the game, the players' multi-stage
decision problem can be effectively reduced to a single-stage decision problem (under
very weak conditions). Section 6 yields the empirical results for the estimation of
the expected utility models. We compare also the predictive power of the various
models (including the decision models based on rules of thumb). Section 7 estimates
the expected utility models while allowing for differences between the players' per-
4 For a recent survey on bounded rationality, see Conlisk (1996).
4ceived odds and their "true" odds. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and offers
suggestions for further research.
2 The Game
LltvGO is a word game which is played almost every day on Dutch television. By July
1997, it has been played more than 1350 times. Each play involves a"pre-final" and
a"final". In the pre-final two couples have to guess five-letter words. For each word
they guess correctly the couple receives f50. The couple which has solved the most
five-letter words at the end of the pre-final progresses to the final. The other couple
goes home with the money it has won.
Our main interest is in the final. The final is played over a maximum number
of five rounds. In essence, each round involves an elementary lottery, as depicted in
Figure 1. The couple enters the round with a particulaz stake. For the first round
this is the amount of money won in the pre-final (excluding the amount won from
the "jackpotn - see below). At the start of each round the couple decides whether to
continue or to stop. If they stop, they take home their current stake. If they continue,
they must play a lottery. If they win the lottery, their stake for the start of the next
round doubles, but if they lose, all money is lost. In that case, the game stops and
the couple is allowed to come back the next show unless this is their third, and last,
final. If they come back they play again a pre-final against another couple, in which
they either drop off, or win and enter the next final.s Once a couple has stopped, or
won the lottery in all five rounds, they are not allowed to come back.
The actual game in each round of the final again involves guessing a five letter
word. The maximum number oï attempts for each word is five. The number of
attempts determines the number of balls a couple has to draw from an urn. Consider
the board in Figure 2. At the start of the final each of the open boxes, i.e., those not
filled with an X, contains some number. For each attempt needed to guess the word
in some round the couple has to draw a ball (without replacement) from the urn.
If they have not solved the puzzle in five attempts, they must draw the maximum
number of six balls. The urn contains 35 numbered balls and one golden ball. If
the number of a ball they draw corresponds to the number in one of the open boxes,
this box is filled with an X.s If they draw the golden ball, they stop drawing and go
5 The next show is usually recorded within an hour time, but is shown on television the next day.
6 For each of the nine "numbers" in the white boxes there ie a ball in the urn which contains the
5immediately to the start of the next round. Once one row, column or the diagonal
of the board is completely filled with X's, the game is over and the players lose their
stake. If this happens, we will say that the players "get L~tvco".
In the pre-final there is also a"jackpot", which increases byJ50 aíter each correctly
guessed word. After each word they solve, a couple can draw two balls, without
replacement, from an urn containing green and red balls. The jackpot accumulates
over the shows until some couple has drawn three green balls in a pre-final. This
couple receives the amount in the jackpot, which starts at zero again. Gains from
the jackpot are not at risk in the final. However, when the jackpot has risen to a
high value, this may provide an incentive to continue longer in this final, because the
failure to survive this final (if it is not the third final) yields another attempt at the
jackpot in the next pre-final.
Summarising, LltvGO provides a natural experiment for measuring risk attitudes,
because at the start of each round in the final players face a very simple decision
problem whether to continue or not. The survival probabilities are decreasing over the
rounds, which induces players to stop if the odds become too unfavourable. Figure 3
summarises the possible ways in which a couple can go through the game from the
moment that it first enters the stage. It also shows all the potential sources of its
total accumulated gains at the moment that it leaves the game.
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
Most of the data were generously provided by the producer, IDTV. The remainder of
the data were obtained by watching the program on television.~ We used observations
from finals 633 through 1366. This is a total of 734 finals, but of course this constitutes
a much larger number of decisions, given that each final can last for up to five rounds.
Table 1 shows some key summary statistics for the finals. The entries only refer
to the players who appear in the final. Candidates are selected on the basis of their
ability to guess words and their appearance on television. Hence, there is no apparent
link between the selection criterion and their risk attitude. For most of the couples
we know their gender. Females are clearly overrepresented in this game. For more
same number.
~ IDTV keeps a record of the course of each final. These records are uaed by its accountant for
the ofTicial tax statement. These data should be of high quality, which is confirmed by comparing
them with our observations from television.
6than 25Q1o of the finals we know the ages of the players. By far, most of them are
in their twenties or thirties. Players younger than twenty and older than sixty-five
are very rare. We also know the education level and profession for about one fourth
of the participants. From this it appears that students are overrepresented. We
have little idea how the composition of the sample will affect our measures of risk
aversion. Some indications come from a survey study among Dutch people by Hartog
and Jonker (1997). Respondents were asked the amount they were willing to pay for
a lottery ticket that has a probability of l0010 of winning f 1000. From the answers
Hartog and Jonker (1997) construct a measure of absolute risk aversion. They find
that women are more risk averse than men and that schooling level reduces risk
aversion.
The amount of money in the jackpot can be quite substantial, as indicated by the
maximum of f20450 it once reached. WO is the initial stake in the final (which thus
excludes the gains from the jackpot), while W1 is the amount of money gained in the
final. The average gains per couple is f5158, which would be quite a serious amount
of money for most.
An important input for calculating the odds in the lotteries is the ability ofcouples
in solving the word puzzles. Table 2 gives the frequency distribution of the number
of balls that had to be drawn in each of the rounds of the observed finals. We tested
for many different ways of splitting the sample to search for heterogeneity in ability.
Gender differences, age, or number of appearances in the final do not significantly
alter the ability distribution. The null hypothesis of the distributions being equal
could only be rejected for a split according to the amount a couple has won in the
pre-final round. The table shows the distributions for WO G1 400 guilder. Even
here the differences are small. Since we cannot find reliable instruments for possible
heterogeneity in ability, we make the assumption that all couples have the same ability
in solving the word puzzles.
Table 3 separates the first, second and third finals into the percentage of couples
that continued and survived all five rounds (WINNER), those who stopped before
or at the end of the fourth round (STOPPER), and those who got nothing this
game (LOSER). As is clear from the table, the percentage of losers falls, while the
percentage of stoppers increases with the number of appearances in the final. This
indicates that people are less willing to take risks, if they run out of possibilities to
return. Of the losers in the first fina149o10 (- 173~356) managed to come back into the
7second final, while 54qo (- 61~114) of the losers in the second final returned into the
third final. As this means that the probability of winning against a random couple in
the next pre-final is about one half, there must be only minor differences in abilities
across the couples participating in the game.
An important input for the decisions are the odds at which couples play the next
lottery. The probability Pk(j,n) of surviving with the next j balls conditional on
having already drawn n balls and having k direct possibilities of getting LINGO are
computed in Appendix A(available upon request from the authors). Using the overall
ability distribution f~ from Table 2 we compute the probability of surviving the next
round as
s
PROB - ~ f;Pk(j,n). (1)
;-i
Table 4 shows summary statistics of the probabilities at which the players decided
to stop, and at which they decided to play. On average couples stop at survival
probabilities well above a half. We almost never observe them playing at probabilities
less than a half. Some couples are apparently so risk averse that they stop at a survival
probability of 0.86.
4 Decisions Based on Rules of Thumb
This section contains an exploratory data analysis of the variables players may use
in their decisions. Before turning to decision rules based on expected utility maximi-
sation (in the next section), we will therefore study possible "rules of thumb" that
players might use in deciding whether to stop (y; - 0) or to continue (y; - 1). We
interpret a rule of thumb as a simple decision rule based on an indicator y` which is
a function of variables that can be observed immediately or that can be computed
with extremely little effort. This indicator captures the relative weights that players
attach to these variables in order to take their decisions.
The most interesting decisions are the last decisions in each show and, in shows
where the players decided to stop, also the next-to-last decision. The last decisions of
winners and losers give an indication of an upper bound on their risk aversion, while
the final two decisions of stoppers jointly give an upper and a lower bound on their
risk aversion. Our data set of decisions thus includes stoppers in a given final twice
(the round they stop and the round before that, when they still decided to continue)
and the other couples once (their last "play~ decision, whether they win or lose). The
Stotal number of observations is 888. We assume that all error terms are uncorrelated,
even though we sometimes observe multiple decisions by the same couple.s
Table 5 shows the results of probit regressions. The explanatory variables are:
STAKE: the amount of money at stake at the moment the decision is to be taken.
It is included, because at given odds a larger stake increases the riskiness of the
bet as measured by the variance of the outcomes. For this reason, we would
éxpect STAKE to have a negative effect.
FINAL: the number of finals (including this one) played by the candidates. If FI-
NAL is higher, the number of possibilities to come back is reduced, which should
discourage the players from continuing. This suggests that FINAL has a nega-
tive effect.
BALLS: the number of balls still in the urn. A larger value of BALLS raises the
survival probability and, hence, we expect its effect to be positive.
BAD: the number of positions on the board that give LINGO directly (either 1, 3 or
5, see Appendix A) is expected to have a negative effect.
LAST: this variable is included as a test for heterogeneity. If teams differ in their risk
attitudes, then the more risk averse players will stop earlier. That means that
in later rounds of the game players with less risk aversion are overrepresented.
Because they are less risk averse on average we expect teams to be more willing
to play in later rounds, ceteris paribus.
W0: the initial stake in this final may serve as a proxy for the ability to solve word
puzzles. Ceteris paribus, better players would have an incentive to stop later,
which suggests that it has a positive effect.
PROB: the survival probability. If players in fact base their decisions on a rule
of thumb, then PROB should not have any independent explanatory power.
It might also be too complicated to calculate or estimate PROB on the spot.
Since PROB is a function of BAD and BALLS (though highly nonlinear), play-
ers who could somehow estimate their survival probabilities, would no longer
s The possible correlations will have no easy pattern, since we can have multiple observations
of the same team for aeveral reasons. Either a couple has atopped in their first appearance in the
final (2 observations), or the observations span multiple shows (when they lose in the first final, but
return the next day).need to base decisions on BAD or BALLS separately, once they know PROB.
This suggests that either PROB, or the combination of BAD and BALLS is
redundant.
The first line in Table 5 dces not include PROB, and thus tries to explain decisions
by employing only variables that are directly observable by the players. ExcepL for
the constant, all explanatory variables are significant. Their coefficients also have the
expected sign, including LAST, which suggests the possibility of heterogeneity in risk
attitudes. The second line in the table drops LAST as explanatory variable. The
results are similaz to those obtained for the previous regression, except for the fact
that WO is no longer significant. We have also included the jackpot at the start of
the next pre-final as a regressor in the various specifications. In none of the cases the
jackpot had significant explanatory power. Therefore, we do not report these results.
To see whether we can refute the hypothesis that players follow simple rules of
thumb, we add PROB to the first regression equation. Clearly, PROB has no in-
dependent explanatory power whatsoever (line 3 of 5). The insignificance of the
individual coeí~6cients of all variables BALLS, BAD and PROB indicates the strong
multicollinearity among these vaziables. In the final regression (line 4 of Table 5)
we drop BALLS and BAD as regressors. While the other coefficients are basically
unaffected, PROB now becomes highly significant.
Summarising, the results we obtain for the simple regressions above may well in-
dicate that studying simple rules of thumb may not be so bad in.a first attempt to
build a descriptive model of the players' decisions. The results also suggest that play-
ers take account of their odds by basing their decisions on variables which are highly
correlated with the survival probabilities computed with the help of (1). Finally, the
option value of coming back in first and second finals plays an important role in the
decisions through the variable FINAL.
5 Expected Utility Maximisation
We turn now to the analysis of decision models based on expected utility maximisa-
tion. We are interested in how well decisions can be explained using utility functions
that are often employed in economic analysis. Moreover, we would like to know how
well these models perform when compazed with the decision models based on rules of
thumb, which we estimated in Section 4. The main objective of the expected utility
10analysis is to obtain estimates of the degree of risk aversion.
The decision problem faced by the players seems complicated, because it may be
followed by other decisions. One such complicating factor is the possibility to return
the next show after losing today. Instead of getting zero, one can expect to gain
something from tomorrow's game. The return possibility can be seen as an option
which affects decisions in this show whether to stop ot continue. The other option
element is the possibility to decide again in the next round of this final. For example,
suppose that the game has evolved until the start of the second round. The decision
to stop would eliminate the possibility to make a similaz decision at the start of the
third round and could therefore affect the decision taken at the start of the second
round. In general this aspect would require dynamic programming techniques to solve
for the optimal stopping rule.
In this section, we provide some theoretical results pertaining to the specific game
under consideration. In particulaz, we show that, because of the (weakly) decreasing
survival probabilities over the rounds, the decision problem reduces, under rather
weak conditions, from a multi-stage dynamic programming problem to the choice
between receiving the current stake with certainty and a single elementary lottery.
This simplifies the analysis of the game considerably, and motivates the econometric
model.
We start the analysis by considering a single-round game, which could be the last
round of an actual game. Let U(x) be the utility that a couple gets from receiving
amount x.9 Figure 3(see Section 2) shows the decision tree for the one-round game.
At the start of the round the stake is x. The probability of surviving this round is
denoted p. As explained in Appendix A this probability depends on the state of the
game. The state is determined by the number of balls drawn so far and what has
happened on the LINGO board (see Figure 2). If the players decide to stop, they
keep x with certainty. If they continue, they receive 2x with probability p, while they
expect to receive a with probability 1- p. The amount a represents the option value
of the potential earnings in future games. If they cannot come back (because it is
their third final), then a- 0.
Denote by V(A) the expected utility from action A- 0(stop) or A- 1(continue)
9 This assumes that the two players that form a couple have the same utility function, which
implies that they do not disagree about the decision to be taken. In fact, when watching the show on
television we very rarely observe disagreement about whether to continue or to stop. Moreover, we
assume that they share their gains equally. Because we have no way of knowing how they actually
share their gains, this seems to be a rather natural assumption.
11at the start of the single-round game, so that
V(0) - U(x),
V(I) - (1 -P)U(a) tPU(2s). (2)
If x G a, it is always optimal to continue. Throughout this section we will therefore
assume that x~ a. The players will decide to stop if V(1) G V(0), or equivalently if
p is smaller than the critical probability p' given by
U(x) - U(a) 3
P - U(2x) - U(a) ~ ( )
Observe that p' is decreasing in U(a), which means that continuing becomes relatively
more attractive the higher is the utility from returning the next day. If x G a, we
define p' - 0, and players will always continue.
In the empirical analysis we will use two different utility functions. The first is
the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) specification
1 ry
U(x) -(W lx) 7- 1, ry 1 ~, (4)
where W acts as reference level against which the gains in this final will be evaluated.
We assume that W~ 0 and ry~ 0. Moreover, if W- 0, then 0 G ry G 1, while
lim.~-.1 U(x) - ln(W -~- x). The critical probability p' follows as
(W -f- x)1-" - (W ~ a)t'7
P - (W ~- 2x)1-7 - (W ~ a)1-7, (5)
showing that the optimal stopping rule will depend on all parameters (x, W, ry, a).to
W can have several possible interpretations and will, therefore, be referred to as
the reference wealth level. Strictly speaking, under expected utility maximisation W
would be interpreted as the wealth level at the start of the final. Because initial
wealth may well differ across couples and because it is unobservable, it is less suitable
in the empirical work.ll When we use the CRRA function we must therefore treat
io If a couple shares their gains equally, each would have a utility U(x~2), and an initial wealth
W~2. Since (5) is homogeneous of degree zero in x, a, and W, decisions based on individual utility
or team utility will be the same.
~~ For many players we do know their eduction, profession and age. Ftom these we can make some
guess about their individual wealth. But such data will be extremely noisy. Moreover, many female
partícipants write "housewife" as their occupation, so that we do not have any clue about relevant
household wealth.
12W' as a parameter and interpret it as the average level of wealth of our sample. This
is an important drawback of the CRRA utility function.
In the prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) individuals
attach utility, or more precisely "value", to gains and losses relative to initia] wealth
rather than final wealth. In that case, W- 0 and the CRRA specification reduces
to the power utility function:
xl-7 - 1
U(x) - 1- 7 , 0 C ry C 1. (6)
In their experiments Kahneman and Tversky (1982) find support for (6) as a de-
scription of individuals' evaluation of gains (x ~ 0). The current specification thus
assumes that utility depends purely on the amount of money won in this final. A very
special case is the power utility function for teams in the third final (when a- 0). In
that case 11-ry so that decisions will be independent of the stakes of the lottery. P - z ,
In all other cases the stakes will matter. From our descriptive results in Section 4,
however, we have already seen that even in third finals the decisions do depend on x.
The other type of utility function that we consider is constant absolute risk aver-
sion (CARA):
U(x) - -1 eXp(-ry(W f x)), ry~ 0. (7) y
Parameter ry now denotes the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Using the data
from their survey, Hartog and Jonker (1997) conclude that CARA is a reasonable de-
scription of the risk attitude of individuals with financial wealth of up to Dfl. 100,000.
This is substantially higher than average household wealth in the Netherlands.
The different implications of the CARA utility function can be seen by computing
the critical probability p',
exp(-ryx) - exp(-rya)
8
p, - exp(-2ryx) - exp(-rya)' (
which does not depend on wealth W. Risk neutrality corresponds to the limiting case
with ry j 0. To see this, apply l'Hópital's rule on (8), to obtain,
x-a
17ó P - 2x - a. (9)
The right-hand side of this equation is the probability p for which a risk-neutral
person is indifferent between receiving x with certainty, or 2x with probability p and
a with probability (1 - p).
13Next consíder Figure 4, which shows a two-round game. At the start of the first
round the couple either stops and takes home x with certainty, or they continue. In
the latter case, they survive with probability p~ and lose with probability 1- p~. If
they win the round one lottery, they enter the second round, where the game is of tl~e
same format as the single-round game analysed above, although with a probability
p2 instead of pl, and an initial stake of 2x. The expected value of coming back, given
by U(a), remains the same during the two rounds. The survival probability p2 at
the start of the second round is unknown at the start of the first round. Hence, the
expected utilities from stopping or continuing at the start of the first round of the
two-round game are given by,
V~(0) - U(x), (10)
V2(1) - (1 - pl)U(a) t piE [max {U(2x), (1 - p2)U(a) -~ p2U(4x)}] , (11)
where the expectation in (10) is taken over the unknown survival probability p2 at
the start of the second round. The subscript on the value function V„(.) indicates
that we are evaluating an n-round game. Hence, Vl(A) - V(A) in (2). It follows
immediately that:
VZ(0) - V,(0)
vz(1) 1 (1-Pi)U(a)tPiU(2x)-V~(1) (12)
Hence, if it is optimal to continue at the start of the single-round game (Vl(1) ~
Vi(0)), it is also optimal to continue at the start of the two-round game.
Define the round k critical probability pk
. U(2k-'x) - U(a)
Pk - U(2kx) - U(a) ~ k - 1,...,n. (13)
Tlie critical probabilities have the following useful properties:
Lemma 1 Forboth CRRA and CARA utility funetions the critical probabilities weakly
increase per round:
Pkti ? Pk (14)
Also, for the CRRA junction, for given x, p' is decreasing in W, while for given W,
p' is increasing in x.
14Proof of the lemma follows by straightforward algebra, and is given in Appendix B
(available upon request). The lemma does not hold in general for any utility function,
though.
We can now state the main result of this section, which is summarised in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Ij pZ ~ p„ the optimal decision at the start of the first round oj the
single-round game is the same as the optimal decisiorz at the start of the n-round
game.
Proof: Here, we give the proof for the two-round game only. This setves as the first
step of the induction argument for the general case, which is contained in Appendix C
(available upon request). We have already seen in ( 12) that, if it is optimal to continue
at the start of the single-round game, it is also optimal to continue at the stazt of the
two-round game. Suppose now that pl G pi, so that it would be optimal to stop at
the start of the single-round game. Since pZ C pi and p~ C p2, one has that pz C p"2.
Hence, by definition of p2, we have max {U(2x), (1 - p~)U(a) f p2U(4x)} - U(2x).
Therefore, V2(1) -(1 - pr)U(a) f p1U(2x) - Vl(1) G Vr(0).
6 Empirical Results for Expected Utility
In this section we will present estimates of decision models based on expected utility
maacimisation. As we already noted, we assume that all players have the same utility
function. We assume also that all couples have equal abilities in guessing five-letter
words and, therefore, equal survival probabilities (for a given state of the game).
Ideally, one would want to relax these assumptions. However, we do not have any
reliable instrumental variables to discriminate between risk attitudes and abilities.
In Section 5 we showed that, due to the special structure of the game, under
very weak restrictions (see Proposition 1), the players' decision problem reduces to
an elementary lottery. Expected utility maximisation then motivates the following
PROBIT model for the stop~play decision,
yi - p; - p; -1- E;, (15)
wíth observations y; - 0(stop) if y; G 0 and y; - 1 (continue) if y; 1 0. Teams will
play, if the survival probability p; exceeds the critical survival probability p;. The error
15term e; is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance o2. The
parameters of the model are the degree of risk aversion y, the option value of returning
for teams in the first or second final (at and a2), reference wealth W(for CRRA
utility), and the error variance oZ - E[e?].'Z The error term could capture a variety
of effects. One would be the presence of non-systematic errors in the assessment of
the survival probability. Another would be that individuals make mistakes in their
choices even when they know their odds. Finally, the error term may arise from the
presence of heterogeneity among the players which is not systematically linked to
their survival probabilities.
Table 6 shows the estimates for the CRRA utility specification. The first row in
the table shows the results for a power utilityspecification (W- 0). This specification
assumes that players' utility is determined only by the gains from the game, without
any reference to their level of wealth. The estimate of y of 0.41 is highly significant
(conditional on W- 0), and indicates a strong rejection of risk neutrality (y - 0).
The other rows of the table report estimates of y for different levels of reference
wealth in order to demonstrate the dependence between ry and W. When we increase
the wealth parameter, the estimate for y also increases. With wealth equal to f 50,000,
the relative risk aversion parameter increases to 6.66. All these models with wealth in
excess of J10,000 fit the data about equally well. This multicollinearity arises because
the informative stakes in the games aze mostly concentrated in a range between 2000
and 5000 guilders. Within this range the functions -(10 ~- x)-o~97 and -(50 f x)'S'~
imply very similar critical probabilities p; .
This is illustrated by the following example. Consider a lottery with f4000 at stake
(x - 4). A person with a low wealth W- 10 will play the lottery if the probability
of winning is larger than p' - 0.64. Someone with the higher wealth W- 50, but
the same relative risk aversion will always play the lottery at this probability, since
the stake is relatively low compared to his higher wealth. In order to obtain a critical
probability p' - 0.64 when the reference wealth level is J50,000, a person must have
a higher risk aversion coefficient. Indeed, when y- 6.66, the critical probability for
the 4000 guilder lottery is 0.65, almost equal to the critical probability at (W - 10,
ry- 1.97). Over the range of stakes that we see in the data, the combination of low
wealth and a low risk aversion coefficient implies the same behavior as high wealth and
~a Contrary to standard PROBIT model the residual standard error o is identified. Equivalently,
we could have written y; -(i(p; - p;)-F e; with the variance of c; normalised to one.
16a high risk aversion coefficient. Unrestricted estimation of the CRRA model does not
allow us to identify W and ry separately. The wealth level of Li' - 50 is representative
for household wealth in the Netherlands.13 Hence, if the participants of L1NGO are
representative for the Dutch population, a relative risk aversion parameter of ry- 6.66
would be our best guess.
The results displayed in Table 6 are reminiscent of the findings in the literature. In
general, the literature has found that different measures of wealth have major effects
for asset pricing models. For example, Campbell (1996) finds that if the measure of
wealth is increased by including human wealth, the estimate for the CRRA coefficient
increases substantially. Jagannathan and Wang (1996) study a cross section of stock
returns and find that the estimates of the conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model are
substantially improved by including a measure of human capital in investors' wealth.
Parameters ar and aZ are the estimates of the "guilder certainty equivalent" values
of coming back when playing the first and second final, respectively. That is, at is
the amount of money that players would be willing to pay to be allowed to come
back after the first final. The estimates for al and a2 are both highly significant and
sizable, indicating that the possibility to come back plays an important role in the
decisions taken. Note also that at ] a2, as required by the model.
The relatively high (compazed to the amount of money won on average) estimates
that we obtain for al and a2 suggest that players not only derive utility from the
monetary gains. If participants also attach utility to the fun of playing L1NCO and
being on television, they will continue longer, because this gives them the opportunity
to play the game and be on television again the next day. Our model combines the
utility of playing the game with monetary gains in the "option valuesn a~ and a2.
To see whether the possibility to return invites different behavior, we re-estimated
the risk aversion parameter on the subsample of third finalists. These teams cannot
return the next day anymore.
Table 7 reports the results. Because the number of observations is so small, the
estimates are rather imprecise. Nevertheless, the point estimates confirm substantial
risk aversion.14 A caveat with the third final subsample is that it might be subject
13 Bloemen (1997) estimates median household wealth in the Netherlands at approximately
f50,000 in 1993 and 1994.
14 Incidentally, the unconstrained maximum likelihood estimator converges to W- 46.5. The
unconditional standard error for ry turns out to be 100 times as big as the conditional standatd ertor
reported in the table due to the enormous multicollinearity.
17to selection bias if there is heterogeneity in risk attitudes. People who enter the final
for the third day in a row must have lost on the two previous days. This could select
only those people who very much like to play the game, and~or are relatively less risk
averse than the average player. This would lead to a lower estimate of risk aversion
for the "third finals" subsample. The estimated value for ry is indeed lower than for
the full sample, but the difference is not significant.
The results for the CARA utility specification in Table 8 are very similar. The risk
aversion parameter is significantly different from zero (risk neutrality). The option
values and the fit are almost identical to those for the CRRA model. Without data
on individual wealth W; the two specifications have similar implications for behaviour
in the LINGO game.
To give an impression of what the estimates imply for an agent's risk attitude,
Table 9 considers the choice between x with certainty, or a lottery with payoff 2x
with probability p and a fixed amount a with probability 1- p. The table shows
that an agent with constant relative risk aversion, no reference wealth ( W- 0 and
thus ry- 0.41) would only be willing to take the gamble if the probability of winning
(p') is at least 0.66. For the power utility function (W - 0) the critical probability
does not depend on the stake x. Models with either W- 10 or W - 50 fit the
data better, and imply that teams are more willing to play if the stakes are low. The
critical probabilities aze almost identical for the CRRA and CARA models.
A positive option value a reduces the critical probabilities. Therefore, first-time
finalists will always play as long as the stakes are below al. Even with stakes lazger
than a~, first-time finalists should almost always continue. Only if the stakes are
above 4000 guilders, do they require a survival probability that is more than one half.
This usually does not happen until the fourth round of a final. The most informative
data are therefore the decisions made by third time finalists, who cannot return.
A first step in evaluating the various models is to compare their ability to pre-
dict (in-sample) decisions. Since the CARA and CRRA utility functions fit the data
about equally well, we will discuss the misspecification only for the CARA utility
function. Table 10 compares the actual and predicted stop and play decisions. Given
that the play frequency is 83010, the simplest possible model would always predict that
the players continue. Hence, it delivers a correct prediction of all actual continuation
decisions, but of none of the actual stop decisions. The expected-utility model per-
forms better by correctly predicting 86P1o of all cases. The model has most problems
18in explaining why people stop, failing to generate the stop decision for more than half
of the actual stoppers.
In Section 4 a rule-of-thumb model was estimated to describe the behaviour of
teams. Ií utility maximisation provides a correct description of players' decisions, the
expected-utility model should be able to encompass the rule-of-thumb specification.
For this purpose we estimate the PROBIT model
y~-a(P;-PiltÍ~zifet, (16) ` o j
where p; - p; is the difference between the actual and the critical survival proba-
bility computed at the ma~cimum likelihood estimate for the CARA specification in
Table 6.15 When the probabilities are scaled by v, the coef6cient a should be equal
to one, and all other explanatory variables in the vector z; in (16) should have zero
coefficients. In effect, we ue testing whether the residuals of the PROBIT model are
orthogonal to the rule-of-thumb instruments.
Column 1 of Table 11 shows that the expected-utility model certainly beats the
most naive decision rule, that people always play: the constant term is not significant.
The second column indicates that the expected-utility model correctly captures the
effects of the survival probability, the stake, the "comebackn options and the money
earned in the pre-final stage of the show. Jointly and individually these variables do
not add to the explanatory power of the expected utility model. However, despite
that the estimate of a is so close to one, we find that LAST, which denotes the
number of the round of the final in which the decision is made, W0, the initial stake,
and STAKE, the current stake, are all significant in the last two columns of Table 11.
The significantly positive sign of LAST indicates that people are more inclined to
play the further the final progresses, ceteris paribus. Similarly, teams with a higher
initial stake continue for longer, on average.
To provide an explanation for these findings, remember that due to data limita-
tions we had to make two important simplifying assumptions: that agents are idential
in their abilities as well as in their risk preferences. Barsky et al. (1997) provide in-
formation based on a survey which suggests that heteregeneity in risk preferences is
potentially important.ls The combination of WO and LAST being significant may
ts The other specifications give virtually the same results.
~s Heterogeneity in risk preferences may help to explain why so few people are stockholders (see
Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991), which on its turn might have important effects for the behaviour of asset
returns.
19be explained by the omission of both types of heterogeneity from our model. The
effect of WO is most likely an ability effect: players who enter the final with a larger
initial stake are likely to be more able in guessing five-letter words. For such play-
ers the odds are more favourable than our estimated survival probabilities suggest.
They would therefore continue for longer, even if they hold the same risk attitudes as
their less-able counterparts. With heterogeneity in risk preferences, the population of
players in later rounds of the final will on average be less risk averse. At given odds,
, such players are more likely to continue. Given that the significance of Wo most likely
captures the effect of heterogeneity in ability, heterogeneity in risk preferences may
explain the significantly positive coefficient of LAST.
7 Decision Weights
Empirical evidence based on psychological models of behaviour suggests that indi-
viduals tend to be overconfident (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In the context
of LINGO such overconfidence would lead players to ovetestimate their abilities in
solving word puzzles. As a result, the perceived survival probabilities would exceed
the objective survival probabilities. To model systematic deviations between these
probabilities and the weights that subjects give to alternative outcomes, (cumulative)
prospect theory introduces the concept of decision weights (see Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1979, 1982, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). If people are overconfident, the
decision weight attached to survival is larger than the objective survival probability.
In that case people will tend to play longer than would be justified by their risk pref-
erences. But the longer people play in the LINGO final, the lower our estimates of
risk aversion. When we mistakenly model the decision rule using the objective sur-
vival probabilities, we will therefore obtain biased low estimates of the risk-aversion
parameter.
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Benartzi and Thaler (1995) suggest ttie fol-
lowing transformation from probabilities p to decision weights a(p):
~(P) -
(pb - (16 p)d~l~ó~
(17)
where b is a parameter. This function generates an S-shaped relation between the
probabilities and decision weights. Because it only has one parameter, it can only
generate a limited range of the possible shapes for the transformation. Therefore, we
20will employ the following flexible double Logit transformation:
ea
n(P) - 1 ~ e4 ~
~ - F~ in 1-p~
9 - ~ w
(18)
Figure 5 shows some typical shapes of the transformation. A possibility is an
S-shape siinilar to the one produced by 18. If p- 0 and w- 1, the transformation
reduces to ~r - p. With {r - 0, a(p) is symmetric in (2, 2). The function n(p) crosses
the 450 line above (below) one half when p is less (greater) than zero. In a sense,
p acts primarily as a shift parameter and allows for a systematic over- cq. underes-
timation of the probability. Parameter w determines the curvature of the function
rr(p). A decrease (increase) in w leads to an overestimation over the probability if the
probability is high (low). In other words, w determines the sensitivity of the decision
weight to changes in the probability in specific regions of the interval [0,1].
Players now base their decisions on their own, subjective assessment of their sur-
vival chances. Fortunately, since a(p) is a monotonic and continuous function of the
actual probabilities, the players' decision problem simplifies again to a single, elemen-
tary lottery, where the objective (estimated) survival probability p; is now replaced by
the subjective probability, or decision weight ~r(p;). As under the cumulative prospect
theory, we assume that the decision weights sum to one. Hence, the decision weight
attached to not surviving this round is given by 1- a(p;).
Expected utility maximisation implies again a probit model with observations
y; - 0(stop) if y; G 0 and y; - 1(continue) if y; 1 0, where y; is now given by
yi - ~(Pt) - Pi f E„ (19)
where p; is again the critical probability defined in (3).
Table 12 reports the parameter estimates for the various utility specifications.
For a given value of W, the estimate for ry under CRRA increases if we replace true
probabilities with the corresponding decision weights (compare Tables 6 and 12).
Similarly, under CARA the estimate of ry increases further. This is explained by
the bias in assessing the survival chances. The bias is illustrated in Figure 6, which
depicts the implied estimate for the function a(p). For every observation i we have
that a(p;) 1 p;, and in many cases the perceived survival probability is substantially
larger than the objective probability. If that is the case, a higher value for ry is needed
to explain the observed stop decisions in the data.
21Also, for the relevant range of p; we observe that a(p;) is flatter than the 45`-line,
indicating that the decision weight is rather insensitive to changes in the objective
survival probability. This suggests that it may be hard for players to assess the effects
oí changes in the number of balls drawn and the number of LINGO possibilities on
their odds.
Table 13 expresses the increase in the estimated degree of risk aversion in terms of
elementary lotteries. The pattern is very similar for the various utility specifications.
Therefore, Table 13 only includes critical probabilities based on the estimated CARA
specification. At the critical probability p' players are indifferent between receiving x
with certainty, or 2x with probability p' and a with probability 1-p'. A comparison
with the results in Table 9 shows that the perceived survival probability (or decision
weight) in a third final (a - 0) with f8000 at stake has to rise from at least 0.72 to
at least 0.89 in order for the players to continue.
Table 14 shows the estimates of the PROBIT model
- ~ ~~(P~) - P:1 -h Qz. f e; , (20) yi Q J
where z; includes "rules of thumb" variables. The p; aze computed at the maximum
likelihood estimate for the CARA specification reported in Table 12. The results are
very similar to those for the case in which we stick to the survival probabilities rather
than the decision weights (compaze with Table 11). Again, the estimate for a is close
to one in all cases, while in the last two columns STAKE, LAST and WO are all
significant. This confirms our earlier conjecture that heterogeneity in risk attitudes
and abilities may play a role.
8 Concluding Remarks
One of the main problems in economics is the assessment of individuals' risk attitudes.
In this paper we have used datafrom the television game L~NGO to estimate the degree
of risk aversion using CRRA and CARA utility specifications. We also estimated
specifications in which the survival probabilities were replaced by decision weights.
We find robust evidence of substantial risk aversion. Moreover, the estimated
degree of risk aversion is likely to provide a lower bound on the true degree of risk
aversion for the reasons given in the Introduction. However, substantial care needs
to be taken in interpreting estimated CRRA coefficients in terms of the degree of risk
22aversion. This is illustrated by the fact that the estimated RRA coefficient increases
if we condition on a higher initial wealth level. Yet, in terms of elementary lotteries
the effect would be almost negligible.
Another finding is that players display a strong tendency to overestimate their
chances of success. Most likely, this bias can be attributed to overconfidence in the
ability to solve word puzzles. This explanation would square well with empirical evi-
dence elsewhere in the literature that individuals are overconfident in many situations
involving decision making under uncertainty.
Data limitations forced us to make a few simplifying assumptions which in future
work - as more data become available - we would like to relax. We assumed that
players were identical in their abilities and their risk attitudes. For our purpose,
which is to develop some sense of how risk averse individuals are on average, these
assumptions are probably not too harmful. Nevertheless, we find some evidence that
suggests that differences in abilities and risk attitudes may be important.
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VARIABLE Average Standard Min Max ~ Obs
Deviation
Statistics per show
SEX 0.2 0.8 -1 1 734
AGE 32.3 8.7 18 70 401
LOSER 382 689 0 6300 720
JACKPOT 2194 2777 0 20100 720
FINAL 1.4 0.6 1 3 734
WO 481 106 150 950 734
W1 2925 5097 0 27200 734
WINJACK 439 1435 0 20450 722
Statistics per team
SEX 0.2 0.8 -1 1 489
AGE 32.5 9.1 18 70 271
W1 4294 5681 0 27200 500
TOTAL 5158 5889 0 28650 500
Notea: SEX describes the aex composition of a couple: -1, if both playera are male, 1, if both
are female, and 0, otherwiae; AGE ie the age of a pazticipant (the number of observationa
reters to the number oí participants for which we know AGE, not the number of teams);
LOSER ia the money won by the losers of the pre-final; JACKPOT is the amount of money
in the jackpot at the end of the pre-final; FINAL is the number of finals played including
thia one; WO is the initial atake in the final; WI are the total gains in the final, excluding
jackpot wins; WINJACK are the gaina from the jackpot; TOTAL gives the total gaina of a
team, poasibly accumulated over different games and includin~ jackpot wins. The firat part
of the table pertains to all games; the second pazt gives statistica per couple. The number of
observations can be different from the total of 734 due to missing values for some early games.
25Table 2: Frequency distribution of balls to be drawn
1 2 3 4 5 6
OVERALL 0.15 0.32 0.22 0.14 0.081 0.089
WO G 400 0.15 0.28 0.23 0.14 0.081 0.120
W01400 0.15 0.35 0.22 0.13 0.080 0.073
Notes: The entries report the frequency of the number of balls
to be drawn from the urn per round. The OVERALL line is the
average over all plays. The other lines aplit the sample according
to initial stakes (WO G~ 400).
Table 3: Finals separated in winners, losers and stoppers
FINAL 1 2 3
-- ABS PERC ABS PERC ABS PERC
WINNER 55 11 16 9 4 7
STOPPER 89 18 43 25 22 36
LOSER 356 71 114 66 35 57
TOTAL 500 100 173 100 61 100
Notes: Entries report the number of finals that end with a couple winning
alI five rounda (WINNER), couplea deciding to stop (STOPPER), and
couplea ending the round with nothing (LOSER). ABS ie the absolute
number of finals, and PERC the percentage of total.
Table 4: Odds at decision moments
Average Standard Min Max
Deviation
STOPPERS 0.62 0.08 0.44 0.86
PLAYERS 0.71 0.11 0.46 0.88
Notes: The entries show the survival probabilities, when couplea
made their last play decision, or when they stopped.
26Table 5: Probit Regressions for Rules of Thumb
CONST PROB STAKE FINAL BALLS BAD LAST WO ln L
-0.98 - -0.37 -0.37 0.09 -0.17 0.33 1.87 -263.68
(1.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.12) (0.73)
0.70 - -0.28 -0.37 0.08 -0.16 - 1.14 -266.80
(0.80) (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.68)
1.31 -4.21 -0.37 -0.36 0.14 -0.42 0.35 1.90 -263.59
(5.82) (9.93) (0.05) (0.09) (0.12) (0.59) (0.13) (0.74)
-0.18 3.61 -0.30 -0.37 - - - 1.42 -268.03
(0.53) (0.72) (0.03) (0.09) (0.64)
Notes: Dependent variable is the play~stop decision (1~0). Explanatory variables are a conatant
(CONST), the probability to survive next round (PROB), the prize money at stake (STAKE),
the number of times the team appeared in the final including this final (FINAL), the numbet of
balls still in the urn (BALLS), the number of direct LiNCO possibilities (BAD), the round of
play in this final (LAST) and the amount with which the team enters the final (WO). Standard
errors are in parentheses. The last column reports the maximised value of the loglikelihood
function.
27Table 6: Parameter Estimates of CRRA Utility Function
W y a~ aZ Q In L
0 0.41 1.86 1.49 0.23 -284.676
(o.os) (o.zs) (o.2s) (0.03)
2 0.93 1.94 1.57 0.20 -269.683
(o.lo) (o.z2) (0.23) (o.oz)
10 1.97 1.96 1.56 0.20 -265.502
(0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (o.oz)
20 3.16 1.96 1.55 0.20 -264.103
(0.36) (0.23) (0.26) (0.02)
50 6.66 1.96 1.54 0.21 -263.473
(0.60) (0.26) (0.26) (0.03)
100 12.46 1.95 1.53 0.21 -263.265
(1.48) (0.24) (0.27) (0.02)
Notes: Dependent variable is the play~stop decision (1~0). ry is
the coefficient of relative riak aversion in the CRRA model. W
denotes the reference level of wealth in units of J1000; a~ and aZ
are the equivalent guilder amounts of the "comeback" utilities
(in units of 1000 guildera). In L is the value of the log likelihood
at the optimum, and a ia the atandard deviation oí the error
term. Standard errors aze in pazentheses. The parameters have
been estimated by maximum likelihood conditional on the wealth
parameter W and using the survival probabilitiea p;. Estimates
and standard errors aze given conditional on aeveral values of W.
The number of observationa ia N- 888.
Table 7: Constant Relative Risk Aversion: Subsample Results
W 7 v N ln L
50 4.95 0.17 83 -38.354
(1.54) (0.03)
Notes: Dependent variable is the play~etop decision (1~0).
ry is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. See Table 6 for
eaplanatory notes. Estimates are based on the subsample
of teams that are in the final for the third, and last, time.
28Table 8: Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
7 at aZ a N ln L
All games 0.12 1.95 1.53 0.21 888 -263.065
(o.ol) (0.24) (0.27) (0.02)
Third finals 0.09 0.17 83 -38.366
(0.03) (0.04)
Notes: Dependent variable is the play~stop decision (1~0). ry is the coefficient
of absolute risk aversion in the CARA model. al and a2 are the equivalent
guilder amount of the "comeback" utilities (in J1000). 1nL ia the value of
the log Iikelihood at the optimum, and o is the standard deviation of the
error term. Standard errors are in parentheses. "AIl games" uses all data, while
"Third finals" is only based on teams that aze in the final for the third and last time.











0.5 1 2 4 8
Critical probabilities (p')
0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66
0.52 0.54 0.58 0.64 0.72
0.52 0.53 0.56 0.62 0.72
0 0 0.08 0.42 0.53
0 0 0.02 0.43 0.62




0.51 0.53 0.56 0.61 0.72
0 0 0.04 0.42 0.63
Notes: The entries report the critical probabilities p' for various parameter
combinations of the CRRA and CARA utility functions and for various stakes
x. The parameter a is the option value for teams that have their first appear-
ance in the final. See Tables 6 and 8 for further explanation of the parameters.
The critical probabilities are computed as p' -(U(z) - U(a))~(U(2x) - U(a))
and denote the lowest win probability at which an agent will prefer the lottery















Notes: Entries report the percentage of cases with actual or
predicted play or stop decisions. The column "Misclassified"
contains the wrongly predicted cases as a percentage of
stoppeta, players, and overall, respectively.
Table 11: Expected Utility versus Rules of Thumb
Variable
CONST 0.05 0.26 -3.63 2.53
(0.08) (0.55) (1.19) (5.68)
PROB -0.24 -11.5
(1.30) (10.4)
STAKE -0.09 -0.19 -0.19
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)








WO 1.06 2.06 2.18
(0.65) (0.75) (0.77)
PSTAR 0.97 0.80 0.91 0.95
(0.09) (0.24) (0.20) (0.21)
ln L -262.879 -259.763 -251.601 -250.998
Noies: Dependent variable is the play~stop decision. PSTAR ia
the expected utility decision variable ~. Other explanatory
variables are as explained in Section 4.
30Table 12: Risk Aversion with Decision Weights
W ry a~ aZ ~ w o In L
CRRA
2 2.21 1.03 0.74 -1.25 0.93 0.13 -260.527
(0.64) (0.26) (0.24) (0.65) (0.59) (0.02)
10 4.31 1.47 1.03 -0.69 0.76 0.19 -259.711
(1.26) (0.33) (0.34) (0.38) (0.41) (0.04)
20 6.98 1.57 1.10 -0.58 0.70 0.21 -259.525
(2.00) (0.34) (0.36) (0.33) (0.36) (0.04)
50 14.99 1.64 1.15 -0.51 0.66 0.23 -259.407
(4.22) (0.35) (0.37) (0.29) (0.31) (0.04)
100 28.34 1.67 1.16 -0.48 0.64 0.23 -259.370
(7.92) (0.35) (0.37) (0.28) (0.30) (0.04)
CARA
0.27 1.70 1.18 -0.45 0.62 0.24 -259.336
(0.07) (0.35) (0.38) (0.27) (0.28) (0.04)
Notes: Dependent variable is the play~stop decision (1~0). ry is the coefficient ot
relative (absolute) risk aversion in the CRRA (CARA) model. Probabilities are
transformed to decision weights according to the double LOGIT transformation
(18) with parametere N and w. See Tables 6 and S for further explanatory notes.
For the CRRA model with W - 0 the optimisation algorithm is stuck at a
boundazy solution with ry- 1.






0.5 1 2 4 8
0.53 0.57 0.63 0.74 0.89
0 0 0.17 0.56 0.83
Notes: The entries report, for various stakes x, the ccitical
probability p' for the estimated parameter combination of the
CARA utility apecification. The critical probability is computed
as p' -(U(x) - U(a))~(U(2x) - U(a)) and denotes the lowest win
probability at which an agent will prefer the lottery with payout
(2z,a;p',I - p') over the sure amount x. For further description
of the parameters, see Table 9.
31
wTable 14: Expected Utility versus Rules of Thumb: Decision Weights
Variable
CONST -0.003 -0.11 -4.22 2.42
(0.08) (0.53) (1.23) (5.69)
PROB 0.03 -12.5
(1.18) (10.4)
STAKE -0.03 -0.14 -0.14
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)








~r0 0.80 2.04 2.17
(0.66) (0.75) (0.77)
PSTAR 1.00 0.93 1.13 1.18
(0.09) (0.26) (0.23) (0.24)
ln L -259.335 -258.580 -248.290 -247.582
Notes: Dependent variable is the play~stop deciaion. PSTAR is
the expected utility decision variable r'~;-e~. Other explanatory
variables are as explained in Section 4.
3`lFigure 1: Lotteries and decisions
Game over
' 2x To next round
(if round G 5)
0 Return next show
(if not third appearance)
Fieure 2: LINCO boazd
X X X
X X X
X X X X
X X X
X X X



















This figure depicts all the possible ways in which a couple that
appears in their first pre-final can go through the game. It slso
shows the possible sources of money gains when the couple leaves
the game. WO (W1) is the stake at the end of the pre-final (final).
J 1, J2, J3 is the jackpot gain in the first, second and thitd pre-final,
respectively.
34Figure 4: Two-round game
35Figure 5: Decision weights and probabilities
This figure shows the relation between probabilities and decision
weights (or different parameters in the double Logit transformation
(18). The solid line is the identity transformation ~- O,w - 1.
The dashed line is the inverted S-shape with ~- 0, w- 3, and the
dotted line shows overconfidence with parametets p--l,w - 0.7.
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Probabilitv
This figure showa the estimated relation between probabilitiea and
decision weights for the estimated parameters of the CARA util-
ity function. The plusses (-E) correspond to the observed survival
probabilities.
37Appendix: NOT for publication - available upon
request
A Probabilities
The LiNGO board has 25 squares. In the initial situation 16 are covered (X) and 9
positions are open (1, ... , 9). The initial position is the same in each game. It is
shown in Figure 7. The game is lost, if a column, row or main diagonal is completely
covered. This is called LINGO. In the initial position ball 5 would give LiNGO.
Fi~ure 7: LINGO board
X 1 X 2 X
3 X X X 4
X X 5 X X
6 X X X 7
X 8 X 9 X
A player has to draw a specified number of balls from an urn. Initially the urn
contains 36 balls:
~ Nine balls numbered 1 through 9 corresponding to the open squares on the
board.
~ One golden ball. When a player draws the golden ball, she may stop drawing
new balls.
~ 26 balls numbered zero. The "zeros" are harmless, because they do not appear
on the LINGo board.
If a player draws any of the numbered balls, two additional L1NGO chances open
up. Which of the numbered balls is drawn is irrelevant, because the initial position is
completely symmetric. For instance, if ball 1 is drawn, then balls 2 and 8 give LINGO,
while ball 9 becomes harmless. From this position with 3 LINGO chances the game
transposes to a position with five balls giving LINGO, when either of balls 3, 4, 6 or
7 is drawn.
38The easiest situation to analyse is when there are five LINGO possibilities on the
board. The position is shown in Figure 8. Suppose that at the start of a 5 ball
LINGO round the urn contains n balls. One of them is the golden ball, 5 of them are
numbered balls that give LINGO, while the remaining n- 6 balls are zeros.t~
FiEUre 8: 5-ball LINGO nosition
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
X X X X
A player must draw k balls from the urn. The minimum is k- 1, when the five
letter word was guessed correctly at the first try. The maximum is k- 6, when the
the required word was not found after five attempts. Let PS(k,n) be the probability
of surviving this round of LINGO if k balls must drawn from an urn containing n
balls. The possible outcomes of the drawing process are shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Evolution of 5-ball LINGO
Gold Gold Gold
).INGO 1,INGO 1.ING0
The tree has three branches, depending on drawing Gold, LINGO, or Zero. The
round ends succesfully after drawing the golden ball. The player loses after drawing
17 In the figure we have also covered the cells of balls 7 and 9. Because aíter ball 3 is drawn, ball
7 does not change anything on the board, we assume that ball 7 is taken out of the urn and replaced
by a zero. Similarly, a(ter ball 1 was drawn, we assume that ball 9 was replaced by a zero.
39LINGO, and continues after drawing a zero. The probability of not having LINGo
with the first ball is




The probability for surviving the next ball is
(21)
Ps(2, n) - Pr[Goldl] t Pr[Zero~] (Pr(Gold2~Zero~] f Pr[Zero2~Zero1])
- I ~n-6r 1 }n-7l ( )
n n `n-1 n-ll~ 2~
Since the game only continues upon drawing a zero, the general formula for surviving
after k 1 1 balls follows directly as
Ps(k,n) - ws(k,n) -b ~ ws(1,n)
i-o n - ~
where the weights ws(k, n) are defined recursively by
ws(~, n) - I,
n-k-5




Next consider a LINGO board where there are three direct LINGO possibilities. In
that case only one of the numbered balls 1-8 has been drawn. The round ends by
either drawing LINGO (lose), or by drawing Gold (win). The game transforms into
5-ball LINGO if one of the four numbered balls is drawn that do not directly give
LINGO. If the urn contains n balls, then 4 are numbered balls, 3 are LINGO balls, 1
is gold, and the remaining n- 8 are Zero's. The probability of not getting LINGo
with the first ball is





If ball 1 is a numbered ball the probability of not getting LINGO with the second ball
is equal to Ps(1, n-1), i.e. the probability of surviving one draw in a five ball LINGo
40game with n- 1 balls in the urn. Therefore the probability of surviving, when two
balls rnust be drawn is
P3(2,n) - Pr[Goldr] -~ Pr[Numberl] x PS(l,n - I)
~- Pr[Zerol] ( Pr[Golda] -I- Pr(Number2] f Pr[Zero~])
- 1-I-4Ps(l,n-1)~-n-8r 1 -1- 4 ~n-91. (25)
n n n`n-1 n-1 n-1J
Because of the recursive structure the general formula for surviving with k~ 1 is
Ps(k,n) - w3(k, n) f ~ w3(J, n)
i-o n - ~
}4(~wa(j,n)PS(k-j-l,n-j-1)fw3(kk}'1)~. (26)
where the weights w3(k,n) are defined recursively by
w3(0, n) - 1,
w3(k,n) - w3(k - l,n)n - k- 7 k 1 0.
n-ktl
Finally, when no numbered balls have been drawn, the LINGO board is still in its
original position as shown in Figure 7. When one of the 8 numbered balls 1 through
8 is drawn, the game transposes to the "3 ball LINGOH position analysed above. The
derivation of the probabilities is also completely analogous to "3 ball t,INGO". The
urn contains n balls, one of which is the golden ball, one gives LINGO, 8 transpose to
"3 ball LINGOn, and the remaining n- 10 are zero. The probabilities are given by
Pi(l,n) - n - 1 (27)
n
andfork~l:





where tlre weights wr(k,n) are defined recursively by
wt(O,n) - 1,
wl(k - 1,n) )
-1)f
ia-kfl ~ (28
2a1(k,n) - wt(k - l,n)n - k- 9
k 1 0.
n-kfl'
41B Proof of Lemma 1
B.1 CRRA utility
We distinguish between the case with 0 C ry G 1 and the case with y~ 1. Suppose
first that 0 C ry G 1. We can rewrite the critical probability p' in (5) as:
P(y, ~) - (1 f y)b - 1
(1 f ay)a - 1'
where (remember that, by assumption, x~ a~ 0)
1~ó-1- ~0
x-a 2x-a
7 ,y-W}a)O,a- x-a ~1.
Differentiating yields:
ap`(.) - ó(1 -f- y)6-1 ~(1 -~ ay)ó - 1~ - aó(1 f ay)b-' [(1 -F y)6 - 1~
ay - [(1 f ~y)b - l~s
The numerator (divided by ó) can be written as:
(1 -F y)6 1~(1 f ay)á - 1] - a(1 -i- ay)ó-1 ~(1 f y)6 - 1~
-(1 f y)ó-1(1 f ay)a -(1 -F~ y)6-1 -.~(1 -}- ay)á-1(1 f y)á -~ ~(1 f ay)6-1
- I 1 - ~ 1[(1 f y)(1 f ~1y)1b f I ~ - 1
J `1 f y 1 i- ~y L(1 f ay)1-ó (1 f y)1-b
- (1 - ~) [(1 f y)(1 f ay)]a-, f ~(1 } y)'-á - (1 -4. ~y)'-b
[(1 t y)(1 -F dy)l'-á
1-a-fa(1-fy)1-ó-(lfay)'-á
- [(1 f y)(1 f 1y)~~-ó
.
The numerator of the latter expression is zero for y - 0. Differentiating this numer-
ator with respect to y yields:
~(1 - ó) L(1 f y)á -(1 f ~y)6J
~ 0, if y~ 0.
Hence, the numerator of 8p'(.)~8y is positive if y~ 0. Hence, ify~ 0, 8p'(y, a)~8y 7
0. From the definition oí y it then follows that óp`~8W G 0.
To find the effect of the stake on the critical probability, differentiate p' with
respect to x:
8p' - 8p' 8y 8p' 8a
8x 8y 8x } á~ áx ' o'
42because ~p'~8y ~ 0, 8y~8x 1 0, áp'~8a C 0 and a~~8x G 0.




1 - (1 t ay)-"'
Differentiating yields:
aP~(.) r!(1 f y)-(Itn) [1 - (1 ~ ~y)-s] - ar~(1 f ay)-(ltv) [1 - (1 ~ y)-n]
8y - [1 - (1 f ay)-n]Z '
The numerator (divided by r~) can be written as:
(1 } y)-(ltv) -(1 ~ y)-(ltn)(1 -~ ay)-n - a(1 -F ay)-(ltv) .h a(1 f 1y)-(ltn)(1 f y)-n
-(1 -f- y)-(ltn) - a(1 -f- ay)-(ltn) -{- I 1 f ay - 1~ yJ [(1 f y)(1 f ~y)]-n
- (1 ~ y)-(~tn) - a(1 -f- ay)-(ltn) ~ (La - 1) [(1 f y)(1 f ~y)]-(~tn)
(1 f ay)~ta - a(1 ~- y)ltn a- 1
- [(1 f y)(1 ~- aY)1'tn }[(1 f y)(1 t~y)Jttn
The numerator of the latter expression is zero for y - 0. Differentiating this numer-
ator with respect to y yields:
a(1 ~- n) [(1 f ay)s -(1 f y)"] ~ 0, if y 1 0.
Hence, the numerator of 8p'(.)~8y is positive if y~ 0. Hence, if y~ 0, 8p'(y, a)~8y 1
0. From the definition of y it then follows that ap'~8W G 0.
We can again show that 8p'~8a G 0. Hence, again,
8p' - 8p` 8y 8p' 8a
8x 8y 8x } 8a áx ~ 0'
which completes the proof.
B.2 CARA utility
The condition p2 ~ p~ can be rewritten as
U~(2x) - U(4x)U(x) -1- U(a)[U(x) f L~(4x) - 2U(2x)] ? 0. (29)
Use the definition of CARA utility to write this as
[exp(-4-y.r) - exp(-5ryx)] t exp(-ya)[exp(-4ryx) -}- exp(-ryx) - 2exp(-2yx)] ~ 0 q
[exp(ryx) - 1] ~- exp(-rya)[exp(ryx) f exp(4ryx) - 2exp(3yx)] ~ a30)
43Denote the left-hand side of this equation by the function k(x). Hence,
k'(x) - ryexP(ryx) ~- exP(-7a)[ryexP(1'x) f 4ryexp(4yx) - óryexP(3ryx)],
k~~(x) - 1'Z eXP(ryx) f exP(-1'a)[72exP(ryx) f I6ry~ exp(-lryx) - 1Sry~ exP(3ryx)]~
k~~~(x)
- ry3exP(ryx) t exP(-7a)[ry3exP(ryx) -4-64ry3exp(4ryx) - 5473eXP(3ryx)]-
Note that k(0) - 0, k'(0) - ry[1 - exp(-rya)) 1 0, k"(0) - ry2[1 - exp(-rya)] 1 0
and, clearly, k"'(x) ) 0,`dx ~ 0. Hence, k"(x) 1 0,`dx ~ 0, hence k'(x) 1 O,bx ~ 0
and, hence k(x) ~ O,b'x ~ 0, which completes the proof.
C Proof of the induction argument
Let p2 ~ p„dx ) a. We show that the optimal decision at the start of the n-round
game is the same as the optimal decision at the start of the single-round game.
First we show that if it is optimal to continue at the start of the single-round game,
it is also optimal to continue at the stazt of the n-round game. Optimality of A- 1
at the start of the single-round game implies that (1 - p])U(a) -}- p1U(2x) ~ U(x).
Hence,
V(1) -(1 - P])U(a) f P1E {max[U(2x), vn-1(1)]}
~ (1 - P])U(a) f P1U(2x)
1 U(x)
- V1(~) - Vn(~),
which confirms the claim.
We show now that, if it is optimal to stop at the start of the single-round game,
it is optimal to stop at the start of the n-round game. The proof is by induction.
Suppose that it is optimal to stop at the start of the single-round game. That is,
V](1) -(1 - p])U(a) ~ p1U(2x) C U(x) - V~(0). (31)
The first step of the induction argument, the optimality of stopping at the stazt of
a single-round game implies the optimality of stopping at the start of the two-round
game, has already been shown in the text.
44Suppose now that it is optimal to stop at the start of an (n -1)-round game. This
is the case if and only if,
V-~(1) - (1-pl)U(a)tp~E[max{U(2x),Un-z(l,s)}]
G Vn-i(~) - vi(0) - U(~), (32)
where the expectation is taken over all states s(defined by the number of balls drawn
so far and the number of L~NGO possibilities) that can be reached from the initial
state. For the n-round game starting from the same initial state, hence with the same
initial survival probability pr, one has:
Vn(1) -(1 - pl)U(a) f p1E [max{U(2x), Un-1(1, s)}] .
Because the survival probabilities are weakly decreasing over the rounds of the game,
it follows immediately that, for all possible states s at the start of the second round,
[;,-1(l,s) C Un-1(1) G Vn-1(0) - U(x). Hence,
vn(1) - (],-Pl)U(a)~PIE[maX{U(`22)~vn-1(lis)}]
G(1 - Pl)U(a) f pl max{U(2x), U(x)}
- (1 -Pi)U(a) f PiU(2~)
~ Vj(~) - vn(~)~ (bY (31))
Hence, if it is optimal to stop at the start of an (n -1)-round game, it is also optimal
to stop at the start of an n-round game with the same initial state. This completes
the induction argument.
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